ADA Ruling by Sixth Circuit Defers to Employer’s Judgment in Finding That Driving Was an Essential Function of Plaintiff’s Job

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled recently that driving was an essential function of an employee’s job, deferring to the employer’s judgment even though driving was not explicitly listed as an essential function in the employee’s written job description.

In Swank v. CareSource Management Group Corporation, No. 15-4193 (6th Circuit August 17, 2016), a case brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the appeals court was presented with a plaintiff whose job as a case manager required her to conduct in-home assessments of Medicaid patients.  She was terminated when her disability rendered her unable to drive to the assessments.  In affirming dismissal of her lawsuit by a federal trial court, the Sixth Circuit agreed that attending the in-person meetings, and driving to them, were essential functions of her job.

The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Swank is in stark contrast to the Fourth Circuit’s recent ruling in Stephenson v. Pfizer, where that court declined to defer to the employer’s judgment that driving was an essential function of the plaintiff’s job because the relevant job description failed to explicitly mention it.

A copy of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Swank is available here.

Members of the Equal Employment Advisory Council (EEAC) can read more here.